Thus, by means of just punishment we reassert the moral equality of victim and wrongdoer. -The retributive punisher uses the infliction of suffering to symbolize the subjugation of the subjugator, the domination of the one who dominated the victim. And the message carried in this subjugation is ‗What you did to her, she can do to you. So you're equal.'‖16
As the passage quoted above shows, Hampton sometimes represents the impulse to punish wrongdoers in linguistic terms. The punishment corrects the false claim, which is the wrongful action. Thus it is tempting to suppose that we are to understand this on the model of a claim's being corrected by a subsequent one, as when you correct my false statement not merely because you think I might need to know the truth someday, but simply because a false statement calls for correction. 17 There are a number of reasons for being wary of this interpretation of Hampton's account of retributive desert. To wrong or punish someone is obviously not itself to make an assertion. An assertion belongs to a language, but to what language(s) do wrong actions belong? How can they be part of language? Language has combinatorial form, but neither wrong actions nor punishments can be combined with other parts of language to form compound utterances. Wrongs are not assertions or propositions, though they may imply these.
Hampton also describes crimes and punishments as communicating or expressing a message, representing an idea, implying a claim, or serving as a symbol. These are more plausible descriptions of the sense in which these actions are meaningful. After all, it is certainly true that actions can convey messages. For instance, a facial expression can communicate the message -This pie is sour,‖ without asserting anything, having a propositional content, or being true or false. So we need not read Hampton as claiming that wrongful actions are literal assertions. But, even if we grant that the actions in question can carry meaning in some other way, they are not the sorts of things that carry the assertoric force on which Hampton sometimes seems to rely.
Furthermore, even if the wrongful act did carry assertoric force, that would provide a poor foundation for a moral obligation to punish. As David Dolinko has pointed out, If someone publishes a book asserting that men are superior to women, or Jews to gentiles, or blacks to Latinos, or a book asserting that its author is an Uebermensch greater in moral value than any other human being on the face of the earth, we do not regard it as obligatory on the government to see that a reply is published forthwith. Still less would we think that the government ought to clap the author in jail. 18 In fact, most of us believe that states that punish people simply for making false moral claims are unjust. This is part of what it means to be committed to a right to free speech. But if we cannot punish someone for publishing a book that literally asserts that one person is inferior to another, then how can we punish assault or rape on the grounds that it expresses the same idea? 19 The need to answer false moral claims with true ones does not permit the restriction of speech. Why should we believe that it justifies the even harsher responses of criminal punishment?
The suggestion that we might justify punishment in terms of a linguistic pressure to answer false moral claims with true ones is unpromising. But alternate interpretations of Hampton's defense of punishment are available. For example, in some places she appears to take a more psychological approach to justifying punishment. At one point she says, -it may be that part of what it is to view an action as immoral is to have the desire to reassert the victim's value through punishment.‖ 20 However, this comes very close to a restatement of the old line that retributive desert is bedrock moral intuition. Hampton has certainly promised us more than this.
At other points, Hampton's defense of punishment starts to sound more consequentialist. She tells us that she abandoned the moral-education theory of punishment she advocated early in her career because it elided the significance of victims. 21 One of the negative consequences of crime, and specifically of the message that crime sends, is that it can make victims doubt their own value. 22 So one point in punishing the wrongdoer is to assure the victim that she is as valuable as anyone else. Furthermore, the message sent by the criminal's action -also threatens to reinforce belief in the wrong theory of value by the community,‖ which would likely lead to further wrongdoing. 23 So -we are morally required to respond by trying to remake the world in a way that denies what the wrongdoer's events have attempted to establish.‖ 24 Hampton also takes up Feinberg's claim that punishment provides a means by which the state can disavow the wrong done. The importance of this act of disavowal is perhaps easiest to perceive when it is absent:
To use Feinberg's example, an old Texas Law that allowed a cuckolded husband to commit justifiable homicide against a man found committing adultery with his wife is -saying something‖ profound about the rights of men and women, and the value of life relative to the pain of being cuckolded. The refusal to punish such a murder is expressive indeed-of an attitude toward women that regards them as the property of any man to whom they are married, and an attitude toward human life that puts it second to male pride. 25 In support of this point Hampton reminds us that inegalitarian societies often punish differentially. Crimes committed against members of the less-valued race, caste, class or gender, especially when committed by a more valued member of society, are frequently punished lightly or not at all. 26 The refusal to disavow such wrongs itself has symbolic significance. Through such a failure to punish, the state -ratifies the view that the victim is indeed the sort of being who is low relative to the wrongdoer.‖ 27 Not only does this encourage further wrongdoing, it makes the state complicit in the crime .28
Noting these points helps us to construct the interpretation of Hampton's theory that we favor. We believe that Hampton's fundamental view is that wrongdoing deserves punishment, not because wrongful actions play linguistic roles, but because of the epistemic roles they play in society (specifically, their evidential roles) and the consequences that follow. When one person wrongs another, she expresses the view that her victim is of lesser value by presenting evidence that he is inferior to her. 29 The wrongful act is not merely an expression. The offender does not merely express the claim that she is more valuable than the victim. She has actually dominated the victim, thereby providing substantive evidence for her claim to superiority. This evidence has the potential to make others draw false conclusions about the victim's and the offender's relative worth. In order to protect both the victim and society in general, the state must eliminate this misleading evidence. Thus, Hampton says, [t] his ... may be what Hegel meant when he spoke of the way punishment -annuls the crime.‖ Of course it can't annul the act itself, but it can annul the false evidence seemingly provided by the wrongdoing of the relative worth of the victim and the wrongdoer. Or to put it another way, it can annul the message, sent by the crime, that they are not equal in value. 30 Here and elsewhere Hampton speaks of the evidence provided by punishment, and punishment is said to be justified on the grounds that it has the power to annul the evidence provided by the wrongful act: -[P]unishment undercuts the probative force of the evidence provided by the wrongdoer's action of [her] superiority.‖ 31 The crime cannot be taken -to have established or to have revealed her superiority if the victim is able to do to her what she did to him.‖ 32 By annulling the evidence of the offender's superiority, the state thereby sends the message that the victim is, in fact, equally valuable.
Focusing on this aspect of Hampton's theory allows us to preserve her idea that punishment's justification is tied to its expressive function, without requiring her to defend the idea that it asserts something. This also accounts for the claims made in the passages mentioned above. If punishment provides evidence that the victim is not inferior to the wrongdoer, then the desire to see a wrongdoer punished is a desire to see the victim's value reasserted. Moreover, if a wrongdoing provides misleading evidence of inequality, and that evidence can be countered by the evidence punishment provides, then all the previously mentioned consequences of ensuring that the victim and society have the relevant true beliefs will follow. Finally, our interpretation of Hampton's view makes sense of her claim that punishment is a means by which the state can disavow the offender's claim to superiority. The state disavows the false claim by providing evidence that it is false.
III.
Let us grant, at least for the sake of the argument, that the annulment of the evidence of the victim's inferiority is vitally important and even that this is a proper function of the state. Still, we must press Feinberg's question: Why must punishment be employed to perform this function? Why couldn't we counter the evidence of the victim's inferiority simply by throwing him a ticker tape parade? Hampton writes, -I contend that punishment is uniquely suited to the vindication of the victim's relative worth, so that no other method of purporting to achieve vindication could be preferred to it.‖ 33 A parade is an insufficient response because the fact that [the victim] had been mastered by the wrongdoer would stand. He would have lost to her, and no matter how much the community might contend that he was not her inferior, the loss counts as evidence that he is. Hence the victim wants the evidence nullified and punishment is the best way to do that. 34 A parade might be able to express the view that the victim is a valuable human being. But the crime has done something more than express the view that the victim is inferior. In the next section, we examine in detail the manner in which Hampton uses punishment to annul the evidence presented by the crime. But before doing that, let us note one approach to annulment that Hampton does not take. One possible means of nullifying evidence is to provide what John Pollock has called an -undercutting defeater.‖ 37 Suppose we have a set of evidence E that appears to support conclusion C. Say the conclusion is -It is 5:00 P.m.,‖ and the evidence is a watch with the big hand on the 12 and the little hand on the 5. The evidence seems to provide us with reason for believing the conclusion, but that reason can be challenged. For example, we might find that the watch has stopped. Here the evidential link between E and C is defeated. This type of counter-evidence is known as an undercutter because it undercuts the reason for believing C that E seemed at first to provide. C might still be true (even stopped watches are correct twice a day), but E can no longer be regarded as evidence for it. An undercutter nullifies evidence in the sense that it shows that a bit of information is not evidence at all.
Could this strategy of nullification be applied to our topic? Hampton tells us that a wrongful action presents evidence of the victim's inferiority. Undercutting that evidence would involve breaking the evidential link between the wrongdoer's subjugation of the victim and the conclusion that the victim is of lesser value. We could nullify that evidence if we could find a way to show that the wrongdoer's use of coercive power is not evidence of his superiority. This is certainly an attractive possibility, since most of us, in fact, do not believe that coercive power is any evidence of moral value. The weakest person is as valuable, in the moral sense in question, as the strongest. Given her stated goal of reaffirming moral equality, one might expect Hampton to try to undercut the evidential link between power and value that the wrongful act seems to assume. Strikingly, Hampton does not take this approach. Instead, as we argue in the next section, her allegiance to punishment prevents her from taking it. In defending punishment as a means of reaffirming moral equality, Hampton assumes that there is an evidential link between power and value.
IV.
On a view such as Hampton's, if punishment is to be morally justified, it must accomplish two ends at the same time. First, it must annul the evidence of the victim's inferiority that has been presented by the crime. Secondly, it must send the message that the victim and the offender are equally valuable. These two tasks must not pull apart. Punishment should not vindicate the victim by providing evidence that he is superior to the offender, for instance. But how does Hampton determine for which claim the punishment serves as evidence? How can she ensure that punishment provides a message of equality?
If a certain message is conveyed by an action, it must be either because the action conveys that information naturally or because the action has come to convey that information by convention. Feinberg assigns no message to wrongdoing and holds that punishment's message is entirely conventional. It is because he takes punishment's message to be conventional that he is skeptical about the possibility of justifying our use of it to convey condemnation. Hampton agrees with Feinberg that there is a conventional element to punishment; but on her view, punishment is justified in part because it is naturally and uniquely suited to send precisely the message required. 38 As she puts it: -the call for punishment as ‗retribution' for a crime is a call for the infliction of a kind of suffering that (whatever the societal facts) we are morally obligated to inflict and which contains within it moral censure of the action.‖ 39 Let us first try interpreting Hampton as arguing that the meaning of wrongs and punishments is (largely) natural .40 On this interpretation she holds that the wrongdoer's exertion of coercive power over another person is natural evidence of her greater value. If the fact that one person exerts coercive power over another provides evidence that the first person is of greater value than the second, then we can see how providing a situation in which the second person exerts coercive power over the first would function to counteract that evidence. If you and I wrestle in only one match, and you best me, others will have some reason to believe that you are the superior wrestler. But if another match is arranged, and this time I best you, people will now have some reason to believe that we are roughly equal. Notice that this parallels Hampton's claims about the messages sent by wrongdoings and punishments. In both Hampton's legal/moral case and the wrestling scenario, we have a first action that (allegedly) provides evidence of inequality, while the second action, despite being intrinsically quite similar, sends a message of equality.
This picture also provides Hampton with a means of defending the principle of proportionate punishment. If, in that first wrestling match, your defeat of me was quite decisive, while in the second match I barely managed to defeat you, people will still have reason to believe you to be superior. My defeat of you will give them reason to believe us to be equal only if I beat you as soundly as you beat me. Applying what we take to be the same sort of principle to wrongdoing and punishment, Hampton writes:
The more severe the offense, the more severe the punishment is supposed to be. But this makes sense if punishment is a defeat for the wrongdoer in the name of the victim which is intended to express the victim's value. The more severe the punishment, the more he is being brought low; and how low we want to bring a criminal depends on the extent to which his actions symbolize his superiority and lordship over the one he hurt.
This provides a neat picture. Unfortunately, it works only if Hampton accepts the offensive premise that the demonstration of coercive power provides evidence of moral value. The fact that you beat me soundly in a wrestling match provides no evidence that you are a superior cook or a superior philosopher. Nor will my defeat of you in the second match provide any evidence for our equality in these endeavors. Similarly, the victim's initial defeat might provide evidence about the wrongdoer's superiority as regards the ability to exert coercive power, but it provides no evidence that the victim is inferior in the moral sense at issue. And if there is no connection between power and moral value, then the victim's later defeat of the wrongdoer cannot give us any evidence of their equality, either. Thus, on this reading, rather than correcting false moral views, Hampton's theory of punishment reinforces at least one false claim: that power is correlated with human value.
Perhaps a more generous interpretation is that although Hampton does not believe in a natural association between power and value, she believes that most people (perhaps unwittingly) do. Thus her view might be that the state must communicate the fact that wrongdoer and victim are equal in a way that most people will understand-even if that understanding is based on a false belief. Because people in general believe that the wrongdoer provides evidence of his superiority by exerting power over his victim, the state must ensure that the victim is able to counteract that purported evidence by exerting power (by means of the state) over the wrongdoer.
On this interpretation of her view, Hampton recognizes that those who take greater power to be evidence of greater value are committed to a false theory of human value (-What we take to be evidence of people's value is ... part of a theory of what human value is‖). 42 But Hampton frequently insists that we must reassert moral truth in the face of its denial. So if Hampton believes that most people adhere to this false theory of human value, we should expect her to provide an argument against the theory. But as we have seen, this is not what she does.
Instead of sending the message that the offender's exercise of power says nothing about his value, Hampton insists that allowing the victim (by means of the state) to exert power over the wrongdoer is the best way to communicate their relative equality. Hampton not only tells us that by punishing the wrongdoer the victim says, -I master the purported master, showing that he is my peer,‖ she endorses this claim: 43 -What you did to her, she can do to you. So you're equal.‖ 44 Hampton allows that punishment can say something about value because it is an exercise of power.
Up to this point, we have been interpreting Hampton as working with a theory of natural meaning for expressive actions. What happens if we assume that the messages sent by wrongdoings and punishments are purely conventional? What if the association of value with power is merely a matter of convention? Unfortunately, this interpretation does not help Hampton's case either. If the message Hampton has been attributing to the wrongdoer's action is conventional, she has good reason to teach people to reject this convention in favor of one that is less misleading and harmful. The prior existence of such a convention would not give her a good reason to buy into it and to encourage its use for the purpose of combating other (false) messages communicated by means of that convention. In essence, this takes us back to Feinberg's worry. If it is merely a matter of convention that we convey the message of equality by inflicting suffering on the wrongdoer, if there is nothing natural compelling us to send the message in just that way, then we should choose a different convention. The fact that we can send the necessary message by inflicting harm is not a justification for doing so.
V.
In later writings, Hampton defends only a weaker version of retributivism. She no longer claims that punishment is a uniquely appropriate response to wrongdoing. She even concedes that, in the right social context, a parade honoring the victim could humble the wrongdoer, thereby achieving just the sort of reassertion of value that she has in mind. 45 She also begins to mention restitution and compensation, as well as punishment, as appropriate responses to wrongdoing. 46 Still, she continues to present her view as a form of retributivism. -[T]he retributive response need not be in the form of a punishment to count as retribution,‖ she claims . 47 In another paper she repeats this point and adds, -any non-painful method, so long as it was still a method of
